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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Policy background 
 
 
Recently, pressures have intensified among the member states of the European Union to create 
multinational programmes in terms of cooperative defence procurements. Such a view was 
forcefully advanced by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker in his 
speech at the Defense and Security Conference, In defense of Europe, Prague, June 9, 2017, stating: 
“There are 178 different weapon systems in the EU, compared to 30 in the U.S. We allow ourselves 
the luxury of having 17 different types of combat tanks while the United States is able to manage 
perfectly well with just one model. Absurdly, there are more helicopter types then there are 
governments to buy them! We must do better.” 
The defense materiel has become more and more sophisticated and technically advanced. As a 
result, its unit costs are constantly increasing[14]. In 2014, the defense budgets of the European 
Defence Agency 1  (EDA) members totaled 195 billion Euros, of which defense investments 
amounted to 34.7 billion Euros2 [9]. The speech by Juncker points out that in addition to better 
facilitating the control of defense expenditures, qualitative improvements can be obtained by 
reducing the heterogeneity of the materiel within European countries. Indeed, as it is well-
understood, Europe’s defense expenditures do not match their efficiency with the comparable US 
expenditures, with the European Commission estimating that the EU would not even be half as 
efficient as the USA [10].  
Over the years, it has been suggested that the cost savings of collaboration in the development of 
new defense materiel may be significant [5]. A recent NATO report on international cooperation 
calculates 40 percent savings for the Alliance in an aircraft acquisition example comparing a sole 
developer and consortium scenario, when considering a 95 percent learning curve and transaction 
costs [24]. However, while this example is purely theoretical, the report states that “international 
cooperation is characterized by a striking lack of empirical data on cost savings and operational 
gain” and “the costing data are usually either classified, too complex to evaluate, or the before-and-
                                                             
1 All European Union member countries are also EDA members except Denmark. 
 
2 According to the statistics reported by the EDA, the UK (10.3 billion euro) and France (9.7 billion euros) 
were the dominating countries in European defense investments (including R&D expenditures) in 2014. 
Germany was the third (4.7 billion euro). The 35 per cent benchmark of the EDA in European cooperation 
was met only by Spain (46 per cent), Italy (40 per cent) and Belgium (35 per cent) calculated over a 10-year 
period. Of course, the European average is held up by the UK, France and Germany which carry out most of 
the defense investments. [9] 
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after costs are not comparable”. About the only public calculations available with savings figures 
are the Nordefco webpages, which estimate 100 M€ cost savings in common development, 
purchasing and maintenance of defense materiel during a fifteen-year period[25]. 
Ten years ago in November 2007, the Ministerial Steering Board of the EDA approved four 
collective benchmarks for investment: (i) Equipment procurement (including R&D/R&T): 20% of 
total defense spending, (ii) European collaborative equipment procurement: 35% of total equipment 
spending, (iii) Defense Research & Technology: 2% of total defense spending, and (iv) European 
collaborative Defense R&T: 20% of total defense R&T spending [8]. Faced with austerity and 
decreasing military budgets in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, in 2012 NATO launched 
the Smart Defence initiative for developing, acquiring, operating and maintaining military 
capabilities in a cooperative manner for cost savings and efficiency [23]. Corresponding efforts by 
the EDA are called pooling and sharing where pooling refers to having capabilities on a collective 
basis while sharing means that some countries relinquish some capabilities with the assumption or 
guarantees that other countries will make them available when necessary [7]. 
Collaboration in defense equipment purchasing is not a novel idea. In 2008 there had been 59 
collaborative acquisition projects in Europe since the early 50s [12]. Two of the main challenges of 
collaborative procurement are the harmonization of operational requirements between the 
participating States, and the agreement on common timescales for the program[12]. In addition, 
European defense collaboration has been inefficient and inflexible due to the juste retour (fair 
return) principle, where the industry of each participating nation should get a work share that 
corresponds to the financial contribution of its own government[26]. Collaborative defense 
procurement programs often incur long delays, both before the actual start of the program and 
during the development process, thereby providing the required capability much later than expected 
[12]. The conventional view is that more partner nations make collaboration more complex and 
inefficient, although they cannot confirm this hypothesis with their admittedly limited number of 
cases [11].  
Collaboration in armament production has been attempted and has taken place between arms 
producing countries especially in Europe – though countries protect their domestic production with 
juste retour.4 Regarding the collaborative equipment procurement benchmark, however, the efforts 
have not been realized up to the stated targets as the share of European collaborative equipment 
procurement between 2005 and 2014 was on average 17 % (EDA, 2107).  
In the current article, cooperative purchasing is used to refer to two or more countries purchasing 
existing defense equipment, i.e. military off-the-shelf equipment, in contrast to collaborative 
purchasing where countries jointly develop and manufacture the equipment that they purchase. As 
there is no product development, purchasing cooperation holds fewer risks and has a smaller 
economical minimum unit size, thereby making such cooperation more feasible between smaller 
nations than collaborative development. In addition to the potential economic gains in purchasing, 
such as increased negotiation power and sharing of evaluation costs and information, common 
equipment may facilitate other cooperation benefits in maintenance and in operation phases, such as 
in training and in maintenance. In an estimation of the potential for cooperative purchasing between 
the Nordic countries, the same obstacles of matching time-scales 5  as well as similar enough 
requirements due to independent, national defense planning processes and differences in military 
                                                             
4 For an early analysis, see [16]. 
5 Defense equipment has long life cycle and renewal times and do not easily fall into same time-window. As an 
example of the timescales for decisions on fighter aircraft in the Nordic countries: Sweden has a fleet of JAS Gripens, 
Norway selected the F-35 in 2008, Denmark in 2016, while Finland plans to select an F-18 replacement in 2021. 
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tasks were found [18]. Valášek claims that decisions on how to co-operate and with whom should 
be rooted in a rigorous cost and benefit analysis, along with a thorough public discussion of their 
industrial and political impact [31]. However, these impacts are not easily quantifiable even if all 
the relevant data were unclassified. 
1.2 Cooperative Purchasing 
 
Cooperative actions been extensively studied both in private and public sectors but articles dealing 
especially with cooperation in purchasing are still quite rare [28]. Cooperative purchasing is 
definded as the cooperation between two or more organizations in a purchasing group in one or 
more steps of the purchasing process by sharing and/or bundling their purchasing volumes, 
information, and/or resources [27]. Through co-operative agreements, firms can take advantage of 
economies of scale in one or more of their production processes while remaining separate entities 
[22] and cooperation benefits such professionalism and information sharing [32] can be viewed as 
resulting from scale economies. A number of factors that facilitate more intense purchasing 
cooperation including a small number of participants, geographical proximity, and similarity in 
purchasing requirements [4]. Similarity in size also helps because when one big organization 
dominates, other participants tend to simply use its contracts. It is suggested that success factors for 
cooperative purchasing groups that include no enforced participation; all members contributing with 
knowledge and the fair allocation of savings [29]. The organizational form of purchasing 
cooperation may be determined by the degree of influence held by all members and the number of 
different purchasing activities involved [27]. In case of a low number of activities they identify a 
project group organization when all members have influence and a piggy-backing group when a 
large purchaser lets the smaller one(s) without much influence use its prices and contract [27]. The 
type of defense equipment purchasing cooperation in this article involves a low number of activities 
because a high number of activities would have a more intensive form and political implications.  
 
1.3 Cases of Cooperative Purchasing of Defense Equipment 
 
In recent years, there have been a few cooperative defense procurement initiatives in Europe. Table 
1 contains a summary of such initiatives as well as their current status based on articles in Jane’s 
Defense Weekly. The first column contains the equipment that the initiative aimed at procuring and 
if a selection has been made, the equipment type. Second column lists the countries involved while 
the third shows the publishing year of the source or, alternatively, the year of the project 
announcement. Then last column shows the latest status of the cooperative procurement initiative. 
Neither the purchase value nor number of units in question is shown because the former is not 
always announced while the latter may change before and even after signing the contract. Because 
the source contains initiative announcements in magazine articles, the table 1 may not be 
comprehensive. 
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Table 1. European cooperative defense procurement initiatives 
Equipment Countries Year Current Status 
NH90 Helicopters FIN, SWE, NOR, DEN 1999 Completed without DEN 
JAS Fighters CZE, SVK 2002 Cancelled 
Transport Aircraft CZE, SVK 2006 Cancelled 
GM 403 Radar  FIN, EST 2009 Completed 
IVECO Armored Vehicles  CZE, SVK 2009 Completed  
UAV Global Hawks 15 NATO nations 2012 Agreed 
A330 Tanker Aircraft  10 EDA nations 2012 NED, LUX agreed, NOR, 
POL, GER discussing 
MAN Military Vehicles  SWE, NOR 2013 Completed with delays 
Radar CZE, SVK, (POL, HUN) 2014 Cancelled 
Smart Bombs Eight NATO nations 2016 Agreed (MoU) 
Self-propelled K9 howitzers FIN, EST 2017 Agreed 
 
However, an overall picture emerges with just a few (11) cooperative purchasing initiatives 
regarding major defense equipment. Out of those initiatives, three involving the Czech Republic 
were cancelled while the other eight are either completed or at least not cancelled. Some initiatives 
have complicated histories with multiple twists and turns, such as the Nordic helicopter purchase 
with Denmark quitting the consortium, and the tanker aircraft where most of the initial initiative 
countries have pulled out, but now Germany intends to join again with an expected purchase 
decision by 2019 and the Rheinmetall MAN trucks initiative where reported issues included delays 
after Norway pulled out of the collaborative Archer project with Sweden as well as legal concerns 
with the deal. The Smart Bombs provided by the U.S.A. were enabled by a recent change in the 
American legal interpretation that until now excluded Foreign Military Sales to a consortium.  
In terms of consortia, there are three large, multilateral projects involving NATO and EDA 
countries of which the Global Hawk is a Smart Defense initiative (Alliance Ground Surveillance) 
and the A330 Air Tanker is an EDA Pooling and Sharing initiative (Air-to-Air Refueling). The 
remaining initiatives in Table 1 include mostly just two, or in two cases, four small countries that 
are either Nordic or Visegard countries working together.  
It would be natural to assume that given the small defense budgets of, say the Baltic states, 
cooperative procurements would be regularly adopted between these countries. Similarly, it would 
be expected that cooperative procurements would be typical among the Nordic countries. As Table 
1 shows, this is not the case, and in fact the situation is quite to the contrary.  
 
1.4 Research tasks 
 
 
When it comes to considering the collaborative acquisition of materiel, i.e. collaborative R&D and 
production, the share of collaboration in the overall investment may be low because many countries 
want to protect their domestic industries and producers of the defense materials. There are also 
problems in the commitment to joint efforts within, say, NATO.6 That there are so few cooperative 
purchases of materiel is harder to explain. It has been noticed that in a large number of cases, the 
advantage of cooperative purchasing outweigh the costs of cooperation and other disadvantages 
                                                             
6 The free riding incentive in cooperative organizations has been analyzed by Holmström[13], 'Aspremont 
[6]and Jacquemin (1988), and Kamien, Muller, and Zang [15]. 
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such as anti-trust (legal) issues and disclosure of sensitive information [29]. However, small and 
intensive purchasing groups do not flourish and such groups often prematurely end their 
cooperation. The economic benefits of a cooperative procurement as a joint venture arise from 
increased bargaining power relative to the contractor, and from reduced costs arising from 
economies of scale in production. They can be expected to provide economic incentives to 
participate in a procurement alliance. There are potentially other benefits like in collaboration, 
whose objectives may be grouped into three main categories: economic, operational and political 
ones [21]. 
 
There is thus a puzzle. Why are cooperative procurements of defense materiel so rare? 7 The current 
paper therefore asks three questions. First, under what conditions do the incentives in creating 
procurement joint ventures arise? Second, why do the cooperative procurement efforts so often fail? 
Third, when are cooperative procurement coalitions stable? To address these issues, a theory of 
cooperative procurements in terms of their impact on national security of the acquiring countries 
should be developed. The previous analytic literature on collective procurement is rather limited 
and no such a theory has been suggested in terms of an analytic approach. To develop such a theory, 
one has to introduce the trade-off between the cost savings and the impact of the procurement on 
national security in a case where the option of cooperative procurement is available but where the 
countries are heterogeneous with regard to their preferences.8 Some data work is available. A study 
of the opportunities for cost savings arising from procurement co-operation between the Nordic 
countries finds – and this goes against the conventional wisdom – that the cost savings are quite 
limited as the Nordic countries tend to purchase equipment which are heterogeneous and aligned to 
national defense preferences [18]. Additionally, even if the national preferences are aligned for 
common equipment, the timing of purchase must be aligned, too. When legacy equipment with long 
life-cycles is replaced, it is rather unlikely that the timing of replacement needs would match 
between two countries. Of course, this is not a problem with new technology, which certainly is an 
enabling factor in the case of the Global Hawk UAV (Table 1). 
 
 
In the development of the analytic model of the current paper, the following mechanisms are 
introduced. The defense structures in organizing national defense are typically nation-specific. Such 
a heterogeneity may result from the need for differentiated products and may require side payments 
                                                             
7 Cooperative procurement represents an action which has some similarities to cartel formation. It is of 
interest, however, to point out that joint procurements do not violate EU legislation. The difference 
compared with, say the formation of a cartel (monopsony), is, however, that no gains in terms of price 
undercutting arise from a deviation from the partnership. Another analogy from non-defense industries 
would be consumer and producer cooperatives. 
8 It has been reported that in the case of NH90 helicopters, Finland was searching for a transportation 
helicopter, Denmark for a rescue helicopter, Norway for a helicopter for catching submarines, and Sweden 
wanted a helicopter with all these properties conditional that the helicopter would have Saab systems [19]. 
As an amusing anecdote was asuggestion by one of the countries that the helicopter should have an option 
for toilets while another country demanded that the option should include a toilet both for male and 
female soldiers [20]. The final offer by the producer included the option for a toilet but was so expensive 
that the toilet option was disregarded on short notice. There was more to it. Of the 18 NH90 TTH 
helicopters ordered by Sweden, 13 were of high cabin versions facilitating surgery operations to be carried 
out by taller male doctors [17]. 
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(“bribes”) between the members in the joint venture to make it sustainable.10 This appears a harsh 
requirement. The potential opportunism in collective procurement may be controlled and 
commitment sustained if the interaction between the coalition and the producer is repeated and if 
the partners adopt appropriate punishment strategies for sustaining the partnership, such as 
abstaining from future commitments in a credible manner.  Folk Theorem suggest then that the set 
of feasible potential contracts is rather large but that some punishment strategies are needed to 
secure the survival of the partnership. Such a punishment may include the exclusion of the deviating 
partner member from the economic benefits from the subsequent cooperative procurements. The 
paper shows, however, that long-term commitment may be even more difficult to achieve not least 
because of the uncertainties attached to the future development of the defense needs in 
strengthening national security and the unpredictability of the advancement of new defense 
technologies. 
There is a further subtle issue. At the negotiation table, the participants apparently understand that 
the unit price to be settled will have an impact on the scale of the acquisition. The paper plans to 
address this issue. It will show that the price sensitivity of the scale of acquisition is favorable for 
the buying partnership as it tends to depress the bargaining price. 
 
 
 
2 Cooperative procurement: an economic analysis 
 
2.1 Basic set-up 
 
In this section, the option of establishing a joint venture on cooperative procurement between 
several (two) countries in considered. There are some basic issues to be analyzed. The question of 
as to how the incentive to establish a joint venture for procurement may arise is analyzed first. It is 
then asked, whether the incentives to commit the country to a joint venture can survive or fail.  
In the model world of the current paper, there are three countries A, B and C. Countries A and B are 
the potential buyers, country C is the delivering country.11 The time-line of the model world is as 
follows. There are four stages (0, 1, 2, 3). In stage 0, country C evaluates whether it is worthwhile 
to develop a new product. The expected future revenue has to cover the development cost, D. In 
stage 1, countries A and B establish a joint venture to scrutinize the products available. Initially, 
they have private information on their defense needs. In stage 1, both countries, however, prepare a 
“list” of the preferred properties of the product under study thereby revealing their country-specific 
preferences.12 The venture learns about the quality of the products produced by country C. The 
                                                             
10 The economic theory of coalition formation has highlighted the free riding incentive. 
11 By focusing on joint acquisitions and in order to keep the theoretical model analytically tractable, the model thus 
abstracts from domestic production of defense materiel. It therefore is most relevant for the case of small countries. 
12 Backward induction will be applied to solve the two-stage decision-negotiation problem. Because the decision 
process involves expectation mechanisms, the model is quite involved. For this reason and to obtain 
analytic solutions in various stages, the basic structure of the model is kept as simple as possible. The 
backward induction procedure guarantees that the solution is time-consistent and that the expectations of 
the partners in the model world are rational. 
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products are multidimensional and technologically sophisticated and the product comes in two 
varieties, a basic one and a more sophisticated one.13  
 
In the spirit of the statement by President Juncker (cf. Introduction), the preferences of the buyers 
do not (necessarily) coincide, in which case the countries need to evaluate the benefits and costs of 
whether to enter the price negotiation as a team or individually in stage 2 with country C. If the 
benefits exceed the costs despite the differences in preferences and if the variety to be chosen for 
the cooperative procurement can be agreed, the countries negotiate collectively. In stage 3, the 
countries decide individually on how many units of the materiel to buy.  
Let the varieties be denoted by 1 (a more sophisticated variety) and 2 (a less sophisticated variety). 
Country A prefers the more sophisticated product to the less sophisticated one. With country B, it is 
the opposite. Denoting the country-specific valuations with 𝑣𝐴 and 𝑣𝐵, it holds that 
 
                                                                      𝑣1
𝐴 > 𝑣2
𝐴, 𝑣1
𝐵 < 𝑣2
𝐵 .                                                        (1) 
 
A sufficient matching between the qualities of the product and the national preferences enhances 
welfare more than a more limited match. The valuation of the product can be thought of being 
related to the substitutes available in the market for the defense material. The contracting process 
may be repeated in the future when or if such a need arises for countries A and B.  
The analysis of the current section focuses on the case where the sophisticated version will be the 
object of the contract between the joint venture and the delivering country. The analysis of the case 
where the basic product would be acquired is analogous. 
As the preferences differ between the countries A and B they have thus two options in stage 2. They 
can negotiate separately (and have lower bargaining power). Alternatively, one of the countries, say 
Country A with a preference for the more sophisticated product can offer a side payment (“bribe”), s 
> 0, to country B to keep it in the team in order to have greater negotiation power against the 
delivering country C. 14  If it is the basic version of the product which is acquired, country B may 
end up paying a side payment to country A. 
 
If the two countries negotiate collectively their joint bargaining power is H  while it is L  if they 
negotiate separately. It therefore holds that 
.LH                                                                  (2)
   
                                                             
13 Alternatively, the heterogeneity of the varieties may result from the different timing preferences of the 
delivery. 
14 When it is country A which prefers the more sophisticated product while country B does not, it may have 
to compensate country B for its participation through some compensation mechanism. Of course, country 
B may join even in the absence of a compensation if the gains from the cooperation exceed the opportunity 
cost of not participating.  
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Despite such a natural assumption, it is not solely decisive for the results of the current paper. 
Analogously, the bargaining power of the delivering country is denoted by 1 − 𝜃𝐻 and 1 − 𝜃𝐿. The 
absolute value of the bargaining power of the delivering country is related to its market power.15 
To develop and produce the product, the delivering (firm of) country C faces a sunk cost for the 
development, a fixed cost for production and a variable cost. If only to simplify the notation and 
without loss of generality, the development cost D is set to zero. The fixed cost is set to F > 0 and 
the variable cost nk where k > 0 is the marginal cost of production.16 The total production cost is 
thus 
 
 
                                                              𝑇𝐶 = 𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘                                                                   (3) 
 
Thus, economies of scale are assumed in the cost structure in that the average cost of production, 
AC = TC/n = F/n + k declines in output n. Notice that there are cost savings for the producer if the 
producer delivers one type only, otherwise not. 
 
 
2.2 National security and welfare 
 
The national security, S, of countries A and B represents a public good and is assumed to be related 
to the scale of the delivery contract, n. Each unit of arms contributes to the national security but at a 
declining rate at the margin. Therefore, it is convenient to allow the production function of national 
security, S, be represented by 
 
                                              𝑆𝑖 = √𝛼𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑖 ,    𝛼 > 0, 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵                                                           (4) 
 
where α > 0 is a measure of the (technical) effectiveness of the defense materiel acquired and 𝑣𝑖 is 
the country-specific valuation of the material.17 The demand for the defense material will be price-
sensitive, 𝑛𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖(𝑝).  Denote 𝑆 = 𝑆𝐴 + 𝑆𝐵. For the subsequent analysis, a notation for the negative 
security effect of a higher unit price of defense materiel on the partnership is introduced as follows 
 
                                                          ∆𝑆 =
𝜕𝑆𝐴
𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕𝑆𝐵
𝜕𝑝
< 0.                                                                 
(5) 
 
From (4), 
 
                                                              
𝜕𝑆𝑖
𝜕𝑝
=
1
2
√𝛼𝑣
𝑖
𝑛𝑖
(
𝜕𝑛𝑖
𝜕𝑝
) < 0.                                                         (6) 
 
                                                             
15 A great producer can benefit from the economies of scale in production. The greatest producer of the 
defense materiel in the world is the United States. Among top 100 producers of defense materiel, the share 
of US firms is 57 % while that of Great Britain is 10 %, France has 4 %, and for example the share of the 
Swedish firms is 0.7 %[30]. 
16 Apart from the role of the declining average cost, another mechanism for the economies of scale is 
provided by the so called “learning by doing” hypothesis [1]. 
17 Differences in the valuation variable may also arise from different timing of when a country needs to 
have access to the new materiel. 
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In stating the price effect on the national security in (6), acknowledgement is introduced concerning 
the subsequent price effect on demand, (
𝜕𝑛𝑖
𝜕𝑝
), which will be analyzed below in Section 2.3.  
 
Now let λ > 0 denote the social cost of public funds per unit of tax revenue.18 Then the social 
welfare function serving as a criterion for the decision making of country A and country B, assumed 
to be cardinal, can be expressed as 
 
 
                                               𝑤𝑖 = √𝛼𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑖 − (1 + 𝜆)𝑛𝑖𝑝,    𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵                                       (7) 
  
                       
The country-specific decision variables are 𝑛𝐴, 𝑛𝐵. It is assumed that the benefit/cost ratio of the 
national security is greater than one, i.e. 
 
Assumption 1.                       𝑤𝑖 > 0,    𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Optimal scale of acquisition in buying countries 
 
To obtain the time-consistent solution, the model will be solved by backward induction. Once the 
contract has been signed, the price p is determined and the countries identify the welfare 
maximizing scale of the acquisition.19 An evaluation of the first-order condition from 
 
                                                                𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛𝑖  𝑤
𝑖,    𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵,                                                 (8) 
 
gives the solutions as 
 
                                                            𝑛𝑖∗ =
𝛼𝑣𝑖
4(1+𝜆)2𝑝2
,     𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵.                                           (9) 
 
The comparative statics are as follows. A high valuation 𝑣𝑖 and high degree of effectiveness of the 
defense material 𝛼 enhance the optimal scale of acquisition for the desired product. In cases where 
the material becomes more expensive, there is a fall in the quantity demanded. From (9), the price 
elasticity is 
 
                                                               𝑒𝑝 =
(
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
)
(
𝑛
𝑝
)
= −2.                                                         (10) 
 
Notice that though the price elasticity is a constant parameter, the price sensitivity  
                                                             
18 This approach is typical in the public finance literature. 
19 Trade in defense material is, of course, often used as an instrument for political power. Our paper is 
welfarist in that the public choice issues will not be discussed. 
10 
 
 
                                                     
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
= −
𝑎𝑣
2(1 + 𝜆)2𝑝3
< 0                                                           (11) 
 
can be small or large by its absolute value.  Moreover, a high tax cost (1 + 𝜆) depresses the 
demand, 
 
                                                   𝑒𝜆 =
(
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜆
)
(
𝑛
𝜆
)
= −2(1 + 𝜆) < 0.                                                  (12) 
 
Inserting the solution (9) into (4) and (7), the implications for national security and welfare are 
summarized as 
 
                                                             𝑆𝑖 =
𝛼𝑣𝑖
2(1+𝜆)𝑝
, 𝑤𝑖 =
𝛼𝑣𝑖
4(1+𝜆)𝑝
.                                        (13)                       
 
In principle, this relationship can be used to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the new defense 
material on national security. 
 
 
2.4 Cooperative procurement 
 
The suggestion that the contracting parties are forward-looking makes the analysis of the bargaining 
process more complicated than anticipated. Several mechanisms are involved. It turns out that the 
bargaining price in equilibrium will be conditional on the scale of the deliveries through the price 
expectations. To develop the insight on results, it is, however, helpful to also limit consideration to 
a situation where the negotiating partners focus on the price, disregarding the forthcoming price 
effect on demand. Before looking into this case, the general bargaining model needs to be worked 
out first. 
 
Understanding the forthcoming scale of the delivery (9) in countries A and B, this section introduces 
the price bargaining between the partnership and the producer. Recall that we consider the case 
where it is the variety which is preferred by country A which is to be negotiated. The easiest way of 
thinking about the negotiation is that there is an agent who represents the diverging interests of the 
partnership with, say, equal weights, ½. Then, a generalized Nash bargaining solution can be stated 
as20  
 
                                                𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝  𝛤 = 𝑤
𝜃𝐻𝑢1−𝜃𝐻                                                             (14) 
 
where the value of the contract to the joint partnership is provided by the weighted average 
                                                             
20 The solution to such a negotiation is called a Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950, 1953)). A Nash 
bargaining solution is a Pareto efficient solution to a Nash bargaining game. In this game, the solution 
consists of each player getting her status quo payoff (i.e. the noncooperative payoff) and an addition to a 
share of the benefits occurring from cooperation. Many applications of the Nash bargaining process allow 
for differences in the negotiation power. This idea is also built into the model of the current paper. 
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                                                         𝑤 =
1
2
𝑤𝐴 +
1
2
𝑤𝐵                                                           (15) 
 
and the value to the delivering country is 
 
          𝑢 = 𝑛𝑝 − (𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘).                                                          (16) 
 
The threat point in the bargaining game is thus assumed to be (0,0). Having a positive threat point 
for the partnership would complicate the notation unnecessarily without any essential further 
insight. To highlight the threat point for (the firm or country) C, it will not participate in 
development or delivery unless the cost of development and the production cost are expected to be 
covered by the contract.  
 
In the cooperative procurement, the scale of the contract is given by 
 
                                                              𝑛 = 𝑛𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵.                                                            (17) 
 
Taking the logarithms,  
 
                              𝑝∗ = arg 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑔  𝛤 = 𝜃𝐻 log(𝑤) + (1 − 𝜃𝐻) log(𝑢)                         (18) 
 
The function 𝛤  is continuous for all 0p  and has the first and second derivatives in that domain. 
Its concavity in the price is no issue because of the logarithmic transformation. The first-order 
condition is given by 
 
                                                 𝜃𝐻
𝑤𝑝
𝑤
+ (1 − 𝜃𝐻)
𝑢𝑝
𝑢
 = 0.                                     (19) 
 
The contract is subject to the incentive constraints of country B in participating, country A in paying 
a potential side payment (to be analyzed below), and country C in developing the product. The first-
order condition for the bargaining price can be developed as follows 
 
𝜃𝐻
𝜕(𝑆𝐴 + 𝑆𝐵 − (1 + 𝜆)𝑛𝑝)/𝜕𝑝
𝑆𝐴 + 𝑆𝐵 − (1 + 𝜆)𝑛𝑝
+ 
 
(1 − 𝜃𝐻)
𝜕(𝑛𝑝 − (𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘))/𝜕𝑝
𝑛𝑝 − (𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘)
= 0. 
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When evaluating the derivatives, recall 𝑛 = 𝑛(𝑝)  from (9) and 𝑆 = 𝑆𝐴 + 𝑆𝐵.  Multiplying the 
denominators, the condition can be stated as 
 
                                                               𝑎𝑝2 + 𝑏𝑝 + 𝑐 = 0                                                          (20) 
 
 
with parameters 
𝑎 =  −(1 + 𝜆) (
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
) 𝑛 > 0 
 
𝑏 = 𝜃𝐻 [∆𝑆𝑛 + (1 + 𝜆)(𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘) (
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
)] + (1 − 𝜃𝐻)[𝑆 + 𝑘(1 + 𝜆)𝑛] (
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
) − (1 + 𝜆)𝑛2 < 0 
 
𝑐 = 𝜃𝐻[−∆𝑆 + (1 + 𝜆)𝑛](𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘) + (1 − 𝜃𝐻) [𝑛 − 𝑘 (
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
)] 𝑆 > 0. 
 
Solving (20) for the bargaining price, 
 
                                                        𝑝∗ =
−𝑏±√𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
.                                               (21) 
                      
The solution must be a real number instead of a complex one, therefore the parameters of the model 
have to satisfy the condition 𝑏2 − 4𝑎𝑐 ≥ 0. The parameter space of the model is rich enough in that 
combinations of parameters exist which satisfy such a condition. To state explicitly, 
Assumption 1. The solution is examined in the case where 
𝑏2 − 4𝑎𝑐 ≥ 0. 
However, there are still two solution candidates given by the two real roots, say 210 pp  . As  
−𝑏 > 0 and √𝑏2 − 4𝑎𝑐 <  −𝑏 (because 𝑎𝑐 > 0), it follows that the bargaining process must have 
one maximum in terms of the negotiation price, and one minimum.  As 
 
                                                                    
𝜕 log  𝛤
𝜕𝑝 |𝑝=0
> 0, 
  
it follows that only the smaller root qualifies as the maximum and the greater root represents the 
minimum. We state: 
 
Lemma 1. Of the two candidates, the smaller one 
 
                                                                                𝑝∗ =
−𝑏−√𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
                                                      (22) 
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qualifies as the solution for the bargaining price. 
 
Two comments have to be made concerning the solution for the contract price (22). First, as the 
demand for the product is negatively related to the contract price in the next stage of the contact, 
this dependency is essential for rational price negotiation in the previous stage. Second, the result 
(22) does not represent a closed-form solution to the negotiation price but instead provides an 
informative characterization of the solution at the equilibrium. The reason is that the right-hand 
side of (22) includes the price variable implicitly through the a, b and c -parameters.21  
The solution (22) suggests in which way the contract price depends on the effectiveness of the 
defence materiel (α), the level of bargaining power (𝜃𝐻), the social cost of public funds (λ), and the 
buyer’s price-sensitivity: (
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
). Under given expectations, the effects of exogenous parameters on 
the negotiation price can, in principle, be traced by studying their effects on the a, b, and c -
parameters. The logic of the model requires, for example, that the efficiency of the defence materiel 
in sustaining national security increases, ceteris paribus, the willingness to pay a higher bargaining 
price, 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝛼
> 0.  Parameters -b and c indeed are positively related to α through national security, S, 
and accordingly, so is the bargaining price p* through these parameters. The effect of increased 
bargaining power of the partnership, ceteris paribus, leads to mutually offsetting price effects 
through -b and c parameters and the net effect depends on the price sensitivity of demand. The 
effects of the cost of public funds λ increases the value of a, thereby reducing the bargaining price 
as it should. However, its impact through the -b and c parameters again is the opposite, resisting the 
negative price effect. The reason for such complications is that the contract price is not immune to 
the what the negotiating partners expect of its effect on the scale of delivery in the implementation 
stage of the contract, (
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
). Sharper conclusions on the comparative static effects are available 
where the price effect on demand (
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
) is very small, namely when the availability of substitutes 
makes the valuation of the product more limited, or where the bargaining partners simply ignore it. 
Therefore, introduce  (
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
) = 0 as the limiting case in (22). This also implies that ∆𝑆 = 0. Then, the 
bargaining price simplifies to  
 
                                                         𝑝 =
𝜃𝐻[(1+𝜆)(𝐹+𝑛𝑘)−𝑆]+𝑆
(1+𝜆)𝑛
.                                               (23)                                                  
 
The profit condition of the producer, 𝑛𝑝 > 𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘 and the welfare condition of the partnership 
imply 
(1 + 𝜆)(𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘) − 𝑆 < (1 + 𝜆)𝑛𝑝 − 𝑆 < 0. 
 
Therefore, it follows from (23) that (
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜃𝐻
) < 0. We have established that  
                                                             
21 Such a characterization is typical in other fields of economics – in optimal tax theory in particular. 
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Proposition 1. Even though the price effect on the scale of delivery is small or ignored, increased 
bargaining power of the partnership results in a more favorable contract price. 
 
The supplier is able to make the cost of production, 𝐹 + 𝑛𝑘, be capitalized in the bargaining price, 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝐹
> 0,
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑘
> 0.  An increase in the scale of the acquisition, tends to reduce the unit price as the 
fixed cost per unit of output F/n is reduced. This effect can be seen by dividing both the numerator 
and the denominator by n. (We state “tends” as there is also an opposite effect.) Improved security 
of the partnership, S, raises the negotiation price. The effect of the tax cost (1 + 𝜆)  remains 
somewhat ambiguous, though one would expect intuitively a negative impact. Finally,  
Increased bargaining power of the partnership should reduce the bargaining price, 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜃𝐻
< 0. The 
numerator of (23) is indeed reduced. However, there is also a similar effect in the denominator. This 
means that the it is possible to verify the claim with full certainty, not at least in the case where the 
demand effect is ignored. 
 
The results derived for the case where the bargaining parties simply ignore the subsequent quantity 
effects do not disappear when anticipatory behavior is taken into account but there will be 
additional mechanisms through the demand function (12) in terms of the national security effect in 
the model. 
In summary, the conflicting interests between the producer and the partnership in the price 
negotiation are balanced by the economies of the scale effect and the security effect. The solution 
(21) suggests that the solution for the price is unique and stable – even though the general solution 
(20) involves feedback mechanisms between the price and demand. Our model suggests, that the 
contracting process balances the economies of scale effects of the producer and the security effect 
of the buyers. 
 
The intuition suggests that the contracting price is low when the price sensitivity of the partnership, 
(
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝
) , is high and that it is higher when the price sensitivity is low. To examine, write the solution 
for the price as 
 
𝑝 = (−
𝑏
2𝑎
) − √(−
𝑏
2𝑎
)
2
−
𝑐
𝑎
. 
 
After some algebra, the first term can be evaluated as 
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(−
𝑏
2𝑎
) =
−1
(
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝)
(1 + 𝜆)𝑛[−𝜃𝐻∆𝑆𝑛 + (1 + 𝜆)𝑛2] + 𝜑 > 0, 
 
where 𝜑 is a positive constant.  
 
2.5 Country-by-country negotiation 
 
The above analytic model can be employed to cope with country-by-country negotiation. Recall that 
country A values (the sophisticated) product more than country B. This means that it is willing to 
buy more of it than county B, 𝑛𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵 (recall the demand function (12)). If country B also enters a 
deal, it buys the basic product better matching its preferences (and potentially with a different 
effectiveness parameter α). The producer has, however, to pay twice the fixed cost to the extent the 
production lines must be duplicated and thereby it loses some of the economies of scale. In 
individual bargaining, the bargaining power for both A and B is reduced. In the general model with 
solution (20), there are again mutually offsetting effects obscuring the total effect somewhat. 
Resorting to the limiting case (21), the following conclusion is available: 
 
Proposition 2: Vanishing bargaining power in individual country-by-country bargaining always 
result in a higher price 𝑝𝐴 > 𝑝 for country A and 𝑝𝐵 > 𝑝 for country B. Cooperative procurement 
always results in a lower contract price than country-by-country bargaining. 
 
In the general model, the price effect reduces the demand. Both buyers face a higher price. Country 
A is definitively a loser. However, the country security effect on country B is positive as it obtains 
the variety it prefers. It may actually gain from country-by-country negotiation, even though it faces 
a higher price. It therefore follows: 
 
Corollary 1. Country A always loses in the country-by-country negotiation while country B may 
gain or lose. Therefore, country A with a higher valuation of the product always has an incentive to 
enter the joint bargaining.  
 
As country A values the product more than country B, cooperative procurement results in an 
externality for country B. Country B has to pay an overly high price for the product which it does 
not prefer. This makes country B strong in terms of negotiation power within the cooperative 
procurement. Can country B benefit of its position? Yes: it can demand a side payment from 
country A to be analyzed in the next section. Unless country A is ready to accept the side payment, 
the cooperative procurement fails. It thus fails, if the incentive constraint of either country is 
violated. When it is country B whose incentive constraint is violated, country A can attempt to 
“bribe” country B to collaborate in the acquisition. 
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Proposition 3. A country with a low valuation of a sophisticated product has strong negotiation 
power and may demand a side payment to participate in the cooperative procurement. If the 
country-specific valuations of the product are sufficiently different, the cooperative procurement 
fails. 
 
The graphical presentation below illustrates the outcome of the negotiation process under individual 
and collective bargaining.  The FF -curve describes the available surplus under the two scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The outcome of price bargaining with individual (𝑤0, 𝑢0 ) and collective ( 𝑤
∗, 𝑢∗ ) 
bargaining. 
 
Under individual bargaining, the producer has a rather strong position and is able to capture a 
substantial share of the available surplus. Under collective bargaining, the cooperative procurement 
shares the surplus more in favor of the buyers. 
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2.5 The economics of side payments 
 
In the model above, it is assumed that the negotiating partners are forward-looking in that they pay 
attention to the price effect on their desired scale of the delivery. When this effect is small, it was 
possible to confirm that individual bargaining definitively results in a higher price for both A and B. 
The national security of B and thus its welfare could, however, be increased because through 
individual bargaining B has access to the preferred product. The incentive for B to join the 
partnership is dictated by the welfare gain, 
                                                                    𝑤𝑐
𝐵 − 𝑤0
𝐵,                                                              (23) 
where 𝑤𝑐
𝐵 is the welfare under cooperative procurement and 𝑤0
𝐵 is the welfare under country-by-
country bargaining.  
 
If (23) is positive, B may prefer the partnership solution even without a side payment. However, if 
(23) is negative, it will join only if A commits to pay a sufficient side payment. 
Consider the incentive constraint for country B. A less expensive and less sophisticated product 
would satisfy its needs, but as a partner it has to participate in a contract which is less expensive but 
does not sufficiently match with its needs. The incentive constraint for country B for participation 
can therefore be stated as 
 
                                                                    𝑤𝑐
𝐵 + 𝑠 − 𝑤0
𝐵 ≥ 0                                                        (24) 
 
The incentive for country A to commit to the partnership is that the side payment which it has to pay 
to country B satisfies 
 
                                                           𝑤𝑐
𝐴 − 𝑠 − 𝑤0
𝐴 ≥ 0                                                         (25) 
 
where 𝑤𝑐
𝐴  is the welfare under cooperative procurement and 𝑤0
𝐴  under country-by-country 
bargaining.  
 
To conclude,                                   
Proposition 4. For the coalition to be sustained, it is necessary for a partnership member with a 
higher valuation of the product to have an incentive of committing to pay a side payment to the 
partnership member with a lower valuation of the product in the case where the incentive constraint 
of the latter country is violated. 
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3. Future defense needs and repeated bargaining: Is a longer-term 
view relevant? 
 
The above results help to explain the real-world experience in that cooperative procurements are not 
that frequent. Our analysis was based on a one-shot interaction between the candidate countries for 
cooperative procurement. It is not, however, excluded that longer-term commitment to cooperation 
might have its benefits. Why would a longer-term commitment appear lucrative? The answer is 
obvious: uncertainty about the future. Indeed, future needs to strengthen defense capacity are 
subject to uncertainty and countries are not aware of those future needs at any particular point in 
time. The evolution of the needs may arise from unpredictable advancements in technology making 
earlier defense equipment obsolete suggesting that it should be updated periodically. The need to 
update the defense materiel may alternatively arise from a deterioration in national security. 
Therefore, the option for commitment to long-term partnerships vs short-term opportunism might 
arise. Political reasons or military developments may support longer-term partnerships. This 
section, explores such a prospect.  
 
Longer-term cooperation might result in benefits which are not exploitable under short contracts. To 
make a commitment credible, however, there obviously need to be some punishment strategies in 
place for the case of breaking the cooperation pact. It has been suggested in the theory of repeated 
games that the so-called tit-for-tat strategy is particularly successful in repeated games to sustain 
efficient cooperation.22 
 
To explore longer-term relations, assume again two countries, A and B, with current valuations in 
terms of the national security, 𝑤𝐴, 𝑤𝐵, for a defense product. Due to technological development, the 
future valuations may, however, be unpredictable. Let the expected valuations of the future needs 
be denoted by 𝑤𝐴
𝑒 , 𝑤𝐵
𝑒. Let r denote the social rate of time preference for the countries.23 Then, the 
present values of a permanent side payment contract between countries A and B are  
 
(
𝑤𝐴
𝑒 − 𝑠
𝑟
,
𝑤𝐵
𝑒 + 𝑠
𝑟
). 
 
It was concluded above that country A always prefers cooperative procurement over individual 
bargaining while B may not support the partnership in a once-and-for-all negotiation. In a repeated 
interaction, the case is more complicated as B might reconsider the future gains – and they might 
outweigh the gains from short-term opportunism, 
                                                             
22 Using computer simulations, Axelrod ) had observed that the tit-for-tat strategy was the most successful 
in its ability to maintain long-term cooperation in repeated games [2 ,3]. The tit-for-tat strategy means 
choosing cooperative action in the first round, and in subsequent rounds of a game, choosing the action 
that the other player chose in the previous round. This strategy results in a situation where cooperation is 
sustained once it begins, but noncooperative behavior is punished by a lack of cooperation in the next 
round of the game. 
23 Asymmetric deterioration of national defense may make the national time preferences diverge from each 
other. 
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𝑤𝐵
𝑒 +𝑠
𝑟
≥ 𝑤𝐵 +
(1+𝑟)𝑤𝐵0
𝑒
𝑟
.                                              (26)                                 
 
The left-hand side gives the long-term gains for B from the long-term relationship. The first-term of 
the right-hand side stands for the welfare of a one-period delivery contract when negotiating alone 
with country C in future periods. Short-term opportunism arises from a current valuation of the 
replacement technology, say with a lower contract price. The cost of such opportunism is captured 
by the second term in (26) where in the spirit of the tit-for-tat punishment means that the 
partnership gains are no longer available and the expected benefits drop to 𝑤𝐵0
𝑒  once country B has 
deviated from the joint contract. Therefore, the conditions (26) state the incentive condition for 
country B to stay in the partnership. 
 
A sufficient side payment by country A facilitates a long-term partnership. Is country A willing to 
pay? It is if the required side payment 
*s is sufficient to satisfy 
 
 
       
𝑤𝐴
𝑒 −𝑠
𝑟
≥ 𝑤𝐴 +
(1+𝑟)𝑤𝐴0
𝑒
𝑟
,                                                 (27) 
 
     
where the notation is analogous to that in (26). 
 
It is well-known from the theory of the repeated games that the gains from cooperation can be 
shared in a number of ways (“the Folk Theorem”). The real issue is whether the cooperation can be 
made sustainable. The country A is able to prolong the partnership relationship by raising the side 
payment but there is a limit to this. For this reason we state, 
 
Proposition 5. Long-term partnership procurement contracts are not viable if the expected future 
defense needs between potential partners deviate substantially. A high social discount rate makes 
the alignment less expected as it makes the partners attach a low valuation to the distant future. 
 
A country which realizes that its future need has been reduced more than that of its partner, may 
have an incentive to deviate from the joint partnership to take the advantage of its currently lower 
valuation and hence of the resulting increased bargaining power relative to the partnership member. 
This is country B in our model. Then, a country with an increased valuation (this is country A in our 
model) may have to pay a higher side payment and has to evaluate whether it is worthwhile doing 
it. It may also try to eliminate such an opportunistic incentive for its partner by adopting a tit-for-tat 
punishment strategy breaking the venture forever. 24 
 
 
                                                             
24 In the current analysis, it has been assumed that the buying countries are independent. A point can be 
made that within an alliance there is a further gain from joint procurements not discussed here: joint 
procurement tends to enhance the compatibility of the defense material acquired. The case of the Baltic 
states – all NATO members – however, points surprisingly to the opposite case: those states decide on their 
materiel acquisitions purely on a national basis without paying attention to the compatibility gains arising 
from joint procurements. 
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4. Summary and concluding remarks 
 
The paper has summarized the cooperative defense procurement initiatives than have been launched 
in Europe in recent years. There have been only a few of them and this is a puzzle. The economic 
benefits of cooperative procurement are evident: it increases the bargaining power relative to the 
contractor, and the economic scale effect points to lower prices. The cost savings can be expected to 
be substantial. To address the issue, the paper has introduced a bargaining model with forward-
looking expectations concerning the scale of the potential contracts. Such a model can be used to 
answer several questions, (i) under what conditions can there be sufficient incentives in building 
procurement joint ventures? (ii) why are these not sufficient to generate more cooperative 
procurements? (iii) can cooperative procurement coalitions be stable arrangements despite changes 
in the technologies or national security?  
 
To summarize, the paper has identified several reasons why it is hard to align the incentives of the 
buyers. The fundamental problem with cooperative procurements appears to be the heterogeneity of 
preferences concerning the qualities of the defense products. With independent national decision 
making and country-specific needs, it is hard to achieve compatibility between defense material 
between buyers. To take an example, an important source of heterogeneity apparently arises from 
different timing requirements as to when acquisitions are needed in various countries.  
It is highly plausible that cooperative procurement would result in increased bargaining power of 
the buyers relative to the producer. However, the results of the analysis have shown that these gains 
may not be sufficient to compensate for the loss of compatibility of the product because the 
preferences of the buyers are country-specific. This holds true even though the economies of scale 
effects are partly shared by the producers with the partnerships of the buyers. The paper has further 
shown that side payments may facilitate the sustainability of the partnership, but it is easy to 
understand how difficult such a procedure would be in practice. Finally, the paper has shown that 
long-term commitment may be even more difficult to achieve not least because of the uncertainties 
attached to the future development of the defense needs in strengthening national security and the 
unpredictability of the advancement of new defense technologies. A long-term commitment to 
repeated cooperative actions between independent nations would necessitate trust between nations 
to the extent that future expected gains would exceed short-term costs.  
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